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REMEMBERING DEMOCRACY IN THE
DEBATE OVER ELECTION REFORM
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ABSTRACT
In FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., the United States
Supreme Court held that the federal Bipartisan Campaign Reform
Act violated the First Amendment right to free speech because the
statute restricted a form of political speech known as issue advocacy.
In attempting to protect this right from government intrusion,
however, the Court improperly excluded considerations of democracy
from its free speech analysis. The opinion consequently
misrepresented the nature of the right to free speech for two
independent but related reasons. First, because preserving a wellfunctioning democracy is the primary reason free speech is protected,
the right to free speech does not exist when it is not justified by—nor
when it conflicts with—the interest in preserving a healthy democracy.
Second, an inductive review of American history and law shows that
democracy is an independent right. The Court was therefore
responsible for determining whether the political speech in question
conflicted with the right to democracy and adjudicating between these
two rights. By explicitly deciding not to weigh the impact that issue
advocacy has on democracy, the Court set the dangerous precedent
that courts can decide free speech cases without considering whether
the speech in question tramples on the interests and rights that define
it and determine its scope.

Copyright © 2009 by Matthew Michael Calabria.
† Duke University School of Law, J.D. expected 2009; The University of North Carolina
at Chapel Hill, B.A. 2005. I would like to thank Professor Neil Siegel for his guidance and
advice while I was writing this piece and the editors of the Duke Law Journal for their
meticulous and thoughtful work. Special thanks to my family and to my fiancée, Molly
Stapleton, for their unfailing love and support.

CALABRIA IN FINAL FOR WESTLAW AND LEXIS.DOC

828

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

2/10/2009 12:02:30 PM

[Vol. 58:827

INTRODUCTION
Americans have long understood that the First Amendment’s
guarantee of free expression protects critical elements of American
1
2
democracy. It promotes tolerance within a heterogeneous nation,
3
protects the diversity of beliefs among citizens, helps citizens
4
separate truth from falsehood in politics, and enables the education
5
of citizens so they are capable of governing themselves. Democracy
and the freedom of expression are so intertwined that Professor
Alexander Meiklejohn describes the right to free speech as “a
deduction from the basic American agreement that public issues shall
6
be decided by universal suffrage.”
In the area of campaign finance reform, however, it is not always
so clear that the freedom of expression uniformly promotes—rather
than degrades—democratic health. In several United States Supreme
Court cases, proponents of campaign finance regulation have charged
that unregulated speech encourages corruption and allows wealth to
7
inappropriately influence policy decisions. Such possibilities have
prompted courts to examine the relationship between free speech
rights and democracy in an attempt to reevaluate how much political
speech the First Amendment should protect.
The Supreme Court took up this task in two conflicting decisions:
8
McConnell v. Federal Election Commission and Federal Election

1. THOMAS I. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 47
(1963) (“It is a basic element in the democratic way of life, and as a vital process it shapes and
determines the ends of democratic society.”).
2. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 11.1.2, at
930 (3d ed. 2006) (outlining the reasons freedom of speech should be a fundamental right (citing
LEE BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXTREMIST SPEECH IN
AMERICA 9–10 (1986))).
3. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 132 (1993).
4. Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J.
877, 878 (1963).
5. THE FEDERALIST NO. 1, at 33 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). For
a discussion of the philosophical and practical goals that underpin the right to free speech, see
infra Part III.A.
6. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT
27 (1948).
7. See, e.g., FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2672–73 (2007) (Roberts, C.J.,
announcing the judgment of the Court) (responding to arguments that the unregulated use of
issue advertisements encourages corruption, the perception of corruption among citizens, and
the undue influence of wealth on politics).
8. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
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Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life (WRTL), Inc. Although less
than four years separated the cases, the Court took opposing
approaches in analyzing the relationship between free speech and
democracy. Whereas the Court in McConnell was sensitive to how
unregulated political advertising affects democratic governance, the
WRTL Court refused to consider these effects and opted instead to
focus on the right to free speech in isolation. This Note argues that
McConnell properly treated democracy as a value worthy of
protection. But because WRTL failed to consider the harms that
political advertising may inflict on democracy, the Court improperly
overlooked this fundamental American value.
The central issue over which the McConnell and WRTL cases
disagreed was whether the federal Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act
10
of 2002 (BCRA) could constitutionally prohibit a kind of paid
11
political advertising known as issue advocacy. Whereas express
advocacy is speech that explicitly advocates for or against a candidate
for public office, issue advocacy includes any speech that mentions a
12
candidate for public office. In McConnell, the Court upheld the
9. FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2652 (2007).
10. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 2, 28 and 47 U.S.C.).
11. Compare McConnell, 540 U.S. at 223 (upholding the prohibition), with Wis. Right to
Life, 127 S. Ct. at 2659 (striking down the prohibition). The extensive McConnell opinion
evaluated the constitutionality of many separate provisions of the statute; this Note addresses
only the provision relevant to the Court’s decision in WRTL.
12. E.g., Wis. Right to Life, 127 S. Ct. at 2659. The BCRA regulates both express advocacy
and issue advocacy because it applies to any political advertisement that (1) “names a federal
candidate for elected office,” (2) “is targeted to the electorate,” and (3) does not expressly
solicit a vote for or against a candidate. Wis. Right to Life, 127 S. Ct. at 2658–59 (citing 2 U.S.C.
§ 441b(b)(2) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004)). The Supreme Court had held since its 1976 decision in
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam), that Congress could regulate “express
advocacy,” that is, political advertisements that encourage voters to vote for or against a
candidate by using “magic words” such as “vote for,” “elect,” “support,” and “defeat,” id. at 44
& n.52. Partly to ensure that their advertisements would remain outside this realm of limitable
speech, political advertisers instead began using “issue advocacy,” broadcasting advertisements
that supported or attacked a candidate or issue without using Buckley’s magic words.
McConnell, 540 U.S. at 131. The McConnell Court noted that
[i]n 1996 both parties began to use large amounts of soft money to pay for issue
advertising designed to influence federal elections. . . . [T]he ads enabled unions,
corporations, and wealthy contributors to circumvent protections that FECA was
intended to provide. Moreover, though ostensibly independent of the candidates, the
ads were often actually coordinated with, and controlled by, the campaigns. The ads
thus provided a means for evading FECA’s candidate contribution limits.
Id. (citations omitted). Congress responded with the BCRA, which prohibited corporations and
unions from airing issue advocacy pieces within 30 days of a primary election and 60 days of a
general election. Id. at 132, 333–34.
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13

BCRA’s ban on issue advocacy. In a 5–4 decision, the Court
reasoned that electioneering communications, including “issue
advertisements,” were the functional equivalent of express campaign
14
advocacy. The Court concluded that Congress could therefore
constitutionally regulate issue advocacy for the sake of mitigating
various harmful effects, including the corruption and perception of
corruption that might result from attempts to buy access to candidates
15
through political contributions.
16
Yet after a two-Justice change from the McConnell Court, the
majority in WRTL struck down a typical application of the same
17
BCRA provision. The majority effectively overruled McConnell,
claiming that “the interests held to justify” the BCRA “do not justify
restricting issue advocacy” because such advocacy is expression the
18
First Amendment protects. The WRTL opinion claimed that the
interests underlying the BCRA did not justify curtailing political
speech. But the Court’s evaluation of those interests was in reality a
19
series of explanations why the Court did not need to consider them.
The McConnell Court’s decision emphasized the need to weigh the
value of protecting free speech against the practical interest in
13. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 223.
14. Id. at 206.
15. Id. at 205.
16. Chief Justice John Roberts replaced Chief Justice William Rehnquist in 2005, and
Justice Samuel Alito replaced Justice Sandra Day O’Connor in 2006. The Supreme Court of the
United States, Members of the Supreme Court of the United States, http://www.
supremecourtus.gov/about/members.pdf (last visited Dec. 28, 2008).
17. Chief Justice Roberts’s principal opinion purported not to overrule McConnell. Wis.
Right to Life, 127 S. Ct. at 2674 (Roberts, C.J., announcing the judgment of the Court). Despite
his efforts, however, seven of the nine Justices expressed their belief that WRTL was in fact a
decision to overturn McConnell. Id. at 2683 n.7 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment) (“[T]he principal opinion’s attempt at distinguishing McConnell is unpersuasive
enough, and the change in the law it works is substantial enough, that seven Justices of this
Court, having widely divergent views concerning the constitutionality of the restrictions at issue,
agree that the opinion effectively overrules McConnell without saying so.”); see also id. at 2687
(Souter, J., dissenting) (declaring the McConnell decision to be “effectively, and unjustifiably,
overruled”). After all, although WRTL was only an as-applied challenge, the Court struck down
a mainstream application of the law. Id. at 2659 (majority opinion). If an ordinary application
could not survive a constitutional challenge, little reason exists to think that many other
applications could.
18. Id. Justices disagree whether paying for political advertising should be considered
political speech in the first place. Justice Stevens, for example, has claimed that “[m]oney is
property; it is not speech.” Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 398 (2000) (Stevens,
J., concurring). This Note assumes for its purposes that political advertising expenditures
constitute political speech, or at least its functional equivalent.
19. See infra notes 38–50 and accompanying text.
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protecting democracy from “the corrosive and distorting effects of
20
immense aggregations of wealth.” Yet the majority in WRTL was
less willing to restrict political speech and perceived no conflict
21
between free speech and democratic health. In fact, Justice
Roberts’s and Justice Scalia’s opinions, which together formed the
Court majority, ruled out democracy as a consideration by
proclaiming that the Court’s sole responsibility is to protect speech—
22
not democracy. The WRTL Court thereby rendered inapposite the
same factors on which the McConnell Court lingered just forty-two
23
months earlier.
This Note contends that WRTL improperly excluded
considerations of democracy from its free speech analysis, setting a
24
one-sided and dangerous precedent for future free speech cases. The
Court erred by excluding democracy from its free speech analysis for
two reasons, both having to do with the nature of rights themselves.
First, democracy is the primary reason the First Amendment protects
free speech. Rights such as the right to free speech are extrinsically
valuable; they exist for the sake of some other interest or interests.
Any number of values—autonomy, good governance, and so on—can
underlie a right. But whatever the underlying interest, a right extends
only so far as the interest for which it exists. One of the primary
interests that justify political speech rights is citizens’ collective
interest in a well-functioning democratic government. Democracy is
thus one of free speech’s reasons for being. By ignoring democracy,

20. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 205 (2003) (quoting Austin v. Mich. Chamber of
Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990)); see also infra notes 25–32 and accompanying text.
21. See infra text accompanying notes 46–52; see also, e.g., Wis. Right to Life, 127 S. Ct. at
2686 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (noting that if “the two
values . . . coexist . . . . [i]t is perhaps our most constitutional task to assure freedom of political
speech”).
22. See infra Part III.
23. See infra Part I.
24. This Note does not evaluate the accuracy of claims that unregulated money in politics
harms democracy; many other writers and organizations have already done so. See, e.g.,
BRADLEY A. SMITH, UNFREE SPEECH: THE FOLLY OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM 12 (2003)
(arguing that the existing election regulation system is effective, that it is not particularly
expensive in the context of consumers’ other expenditures, and that there is little evidence that
it actually produces significant corruption); Miles Rapoport & Jason Tarricone, Election
Reform’s Next Phase: A Broad Democracy Agenda and the Need for a Movement, 9 GEO. J. ON
POVERTY L. & POL’Y 379, 401 (2002) (arguing, among other things, that the U.S. Congress
should implement more restrictive campaign finance measures to “level[] the playing field for
people of color and quality candidates who will represent the interests of average citizens and
the poor instead of the interests of a few wealthy donors”).
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the WRTL majority protected the particular application of a right
without using the proper tools to determine the true extent of that
right.
Second, the WRTL Court’s logic was flawed because democracy
is an independent right and the Court should have considered it as
such. When one right abuts another, courts determining the extent of
one right must consider the other right. A review of the Constitution,
American tradition, and American law supports the notion that
citizens have an entitlement to republican government. By failing to
balance the right to democracy with—or against—the right to free
speech, the WRTL Court sent the message that courts may discard
efforts by the elected branches to improve participatory government
without concern for the Republic.
Part I of this Note explains how the WRTL majority treated
democracy merely as a backdrop, a value that lacks meaningful
implications for judicial decisionmaking. After reviewing some basic
principles of rights theory in Part II, this Note shows in Part III that
the Court’s unwillingness to consider democracy when evaluating
political speech restrictions belied the reasons citizens have a right to
free speech. Part IV explains that democracy is a right of the
American people and shows how the WRTL Court allowed campaign
finance practices to infringe that right. This Note concludes that the
WRTL Court’s treatment—or nontreatment—of democracy is at odds
with any coherent notion of free speech or American democracy.
I. THE SUPREME COURT’S DOUBLE VISION
The members of the Court are sharply divided on whether to
consider the value of democracy when evaluating political speech
regulations. Whereas the McConnell majority affirmed the BCRA’s
restrictions by emphasizing how democratic values influence the
decision to allow government restrictions on political speech, the
WRTL majority cast out democracy as a value unworthy of their
consideration.
A. Considering Democracy When Defining Free Speech: McConnell
and the WRTL Dissent
In McConnell, the Court upheld BCRA provisions imposing
blackout periods before primary and general elections on paid
broadcast advertisements by corporations and unions that mentioned
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25

a candidate’s name. The majority reasoned that political speech
without such regulation would damage the integrity of elected
26
officials and the public’s perception of government. It explained that
the Court’s case law has “repeatedly sustained legislation aimed at
‘the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of
wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corporate form and
that have little or no correlation to the public’s support for the
27
corporation’s political ideas.’” Beyond these implications for the
political process, the Court explained that regulating all
electioneering communications helps prevent the circumvention of
the other “[valid] contribution limits” that restrain the influence of
28
money in politics. It also explained that when candidates receive
large sums of corporate money, corruption and the perception of
corruption that may result can harm the political process. “Just as
troubling to a functioning democracy as classic quid pro quo
corruption is the danger that officeholders will decide”—or be
perceived as deciding—“issues not on the merits or the desires of
their constituencies, but according to the wishes of those who have
29
made large financial contributions valued by the officeholder.”
30
Lastly, the Court recognized, as did the later dissent in WRTL, that
a system that fails to govern the use of money in politics undermines
31
the connection between ideological agreement and political support.
The majority remarked that corporations and other entities often feel
compelled to give “substantial sums to both major national parties,
leaving room for no other conclusion but that these donors were

25. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 189–94.
26. See infra notes 36–40 and accompanying text.
27. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 205 (quoting Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S.
652, 660 (1990)).
28. Id. (alteration in original) (citing FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 155 (2003)).
29. Id. at 153. “Even if it occurs only occasionally, the potential for such undue influence is
manifest.” Id. These quotations appeared in the Court’s discussion of a BCRA provision that
prohibited national parties from receiving certain forms of financial contributions, but its
analysis applied to this provision as well. The Court went on to remark that its
treatment of contribution restrictions reflects more than the limited burdens they
impose on First Amendment freedoms. It also reflects the importance of the interests
that underlie contribution limits—interests in preventing “both the actual corruption
threatened by large financial contributions and the eroding of public confidence in
the electoral process through the appearance of corruption.”
Id. at 136 (quoting FEC v. Nat’l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 208 (1982)).
30. FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2688 (2007) (Souter, J., dissenting).
31. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 148.
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seeking influence, or avoiding retaliation, rather than promoting any
32
particular ideology.”
Justice Souter’s dissenting opinion in WRTL echoed
33
McConnell’s list of concerns and expressed worry that unregulated
34
elections threatened “democratic integrity.” Justice Souter feared
that, if unregulated money corrupted politics, the electorate could
35
become cynical. “[E]normous demands” for funds in an unregulated
setting, Justice Souter wrote, ultimately “assign power to deep
36
pockets.” Because “[v]oters know this,” an additional, “important
consequence of the demand for big money to finance publicity [is]
37
pervasive public cynicism.”
B. The WRTL Opinion
In contrast to McConnell, Chief Justice Roberts’s principal
38
opinion in WRTL dismissed democracy’s relevance. He took up only
two of the dissenters’ concerns. First, regarding arguments that
unregulated issue advocacy risks creating at least the appearance of
corruption, Chief Justice Roberts stated that the Court’s prior
decisions only held that corruption was an interest to be considered in
financial contribution cases and were silent on whether the corruption
39
interest is a factor in issue advocacy cases. In saying so, he did
scarcely more than assert: “Enough is enough. Issue ads like WRTL’s
are by no means equivalent to contributions, and the quid-pro-quo

32. Id.
33. Wis. Right to Life, 127 S. Ct. at 2689 (Souter, J., dissenting).
34. Id. at 2687.
35. Id. For other decisions expressing concern about the harmful effects of corruption, see
McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 148 (2003); FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm.,
533 U.S. 431, 446 (2001); Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 388 (2000); Colo.
Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604, 648 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
36. Wis. Right to Life, 127 S. Ct. at 2688 (Souter, J., dissenting).
37. Id. (citing statistics and analysis for this position).
38. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to the Court’s
holding that it had jurisdiction to decide the case. Id. at 2663 (majority opinion). Joined only by
Justice Alito, he wrote separately to argue that the BCRA was unconstitutional as applied. Id.
at 2663–74 (Roberts, C.J., announcing the judgment of the Court). Justice Scalia, joined by
Justice Kennedy and Justice Thomas, concurred in the judgment, concluding that the statutory
provision in question was unconstitutional and that McConnell should be overruled. Id. at 2684
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Because Chief Justice Roberts’s
opinion was the narrower of the two opinions, it controls.
39. Id. at 2672 (Roberts, C.J., announcing the judgment of the Court).
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corruption interest cannot justify regulating them.” Because no
precedent requires courts to consider the interest in avoiding
corruption in political expenditure cases, he claimed, the interest in
41
avoiding corruption does not apply. Without more, this line of
argument is problematic because it takes the absence of a command
to do something as a command not to do something; that no decision
had yet required the Court to consider the effects of corruption in
issue advocacy cases does not mean that the Court is not at liberty to
take up the issue if it so chooses. Therefore, Chief Justice Roberts’s
first argument concludes that the “corruption interest cannot justify
42
regulating” issue advocacy because the Court’s hands are tied, yet it
was clearly not encumbered in this way.
Second, Chief Justice Roberts similarly addressed the “corrosive
and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth” that prior
Court opinions had argued do not indicate “the public’s support for
43
the corporation’s political ideas.” Roberts again relied on precedent
to argue that this consideration had no pedigree outside of campaign
44
speech cases. For instance, he explained that the McConnell Court
was “willing to ‘assume that the interests that justify the regulation of
campaign speech might not apply to the regulation of genuine issue
45
ads.’” Therefore, the argument goes, the fact that prior discussions
do not mandate that the corrosive effects of wealth be considered in
genuine issue advocacy cases may be taken as evidence that the
effects of money on politics should not be considered in issue
advocacy situations. This, again, is problematic because it conflates
license not to consider something with a reason—or even a
mandate—not to consider it.
Instead of addressing two of the democracy-related concerns
articulated by prior courts, Chief Justice Roberts found reasons to
40. Id. In 1976, Buckley v. Valeo ruled that campaign contributions could be regulated for
corruption-avoidance purposes. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19–21 (1976) (per curiam).
41. Wis. Right to Life, 127 S. Ct. at 2672 (Roberts, C.J., announcing the judgment of the
Court).
42. Id.
43. Id. (quoting Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990)).
44. Id. at 2672–73.
45. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 206 n.88 (2003)). Justice
Roberts also argued that including issue advocacy under a ban on campaign speech “would call
into question our holding in Bellotti that the corporate identity of a speaker does not strip
corporations of all free speech rights.” Id. (citing First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 778
(1978)). He made no claim that doing so would actually overturn or otherwise be inconsistent
with Bellotti, however.
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ignore them. His opinion made no descriptive claim as to whether
wealth and corruption are corrosive to democracy in this setting.
Chief Justice Roberts failed to address Justice Souter’s fears about
threats to democratic governance. As a poor substitute, he used the
same logic to dismiss both of the dissent’s concerns: because previous
Court decisions failed to definitively answer a question, he reasoned,
the Court should not consider the question.
At least Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion outwardly recognized
that it was unconcerned with democratic considerations. His central
argument was that the BCRA’s restrictions on broadcast media were
impermissibly vague, proscribing a much greater swath of expression
46
than the legislation intended. Justice Scalia acknowledged the
concerns raised in McConnell regarding the potentially corrosive
effects of wealth in politics, the potential for corruption, and the
likelihood that corporations and unions could “devis[e] expenditures
47
that skirted the restriction on express advocacy.” But after
recognizing these problems, he stated that speech was the Court’s
48
only consideration. Freedom of speech and “our desire for healthy
49
campaigns in a healthy democracy” may be incompatible in this
case, he argued, but even if the “two values can coexist, it is pretty
clear which side of the equation this institution is primarily
50
responsible for.”
*

*

*

In the McConnell and WRTL opinions, the Justices disagreed
not simply about how democracy is best maintained; they disagreed
on democracy’s relevance. Whereas some Justices claimed threats to
democratic integrity were immaterial, others considered it of prime
importance. They consequently talked past each other without
conveying a comprehensive sense of how all the factors in a political
speech analysis should be weighed against one another. More simply,
Justices such as Scalia who have found it “pretty clear” that the Court
46. Id. at 2680 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). This Note
does not consider the accuracy of Justice Scalia’s contention.
47. Id. at 2682 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 45 (1976) (per curiam)).
48. Id. at 2686 (“Perhaps overruling this one part . . . of BCRA would not ‘ai[d] the
legislative effort to combat real or apparent corruption.’ But the First Amendment was not
designed to facilitate legislation, even wise legislation.” (second alteration in original) (citations
omitted) (quoting McConnell, 540 U.S. at 194)).
49. Id. (quoting Rep. Richard Gephardt).
50. Id.

CALABRIA IN FINAL FOR WESTLAW AND LEXIS.DOC

2009]

REMEMBERING DEMOCRACY

2/10/2009 12:02:30 PM

837

should not protect democracy have failed to consider the practical
51
implications of their speech jurisprudence. This speech-at-all-costs
view both erodes American citizens’ right to democracy and, as Part
52
II demonstrates, belies the nature of rights.
II. THE NATURE OF RIGHTS
Before explaining how the Court’s decision in WRTL is
incongruent with democracy and the logic of rights, it is important to
establish some basic principles that govern rights.
First, no right exists for its own sake. Rather, “rights exist to
serve relevant interests of the right-holder” and are therefore only
53
valuable because they promote those interests. By definition, to
have a right is to have a legally or morally cognizable claim to or from
54
something. Some rights are shorthand for entitlements that people
have to some human good (for example, life, water, safety, and
55
equality); others protect—or protect from—human action (for

51. See, e.g., id. at 2705 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“[T]he understanding of the voters and the
Congress that this kind of corporate and union spending seriously jeopardizes the integrity of
democratic government will remain. The facts are too powerful to be ignored . . . . It is only the
legal landscape that now is altered, and it may be that today’s departure from precedent will
drive further reexamination of the constitutional analysis . . . .”).
52. See infra Part III.B.
53. WILLIAM A. EDMUNDSON, AN INTRODUCTION TO RIGHTS 121 (2004). This Note
builds upon the “instrumental approach” to rights, which asserts that rights are valuable
because—and insofar as—they yield other established social goods. See STANLEY FISH,
THERE’S NO SUCH THING AS FREE SPEECH: AND IT’S A GOOD THING, TOO 102 (1994) (“‘Free
speech’ is just the name we give to verbal behavior that serves the substantive agendas we wish
to advance.”); RICHARD A. POSNER, FRONTIERS OF LEGAL THEORY 62–64 (2001)
(“[A]lthough not commanded by the First Amendment, the instrumental approach has a
respectable constitutional pedigree.” (citing Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919))). Not
all writers have shared this view; some have argued that that free speech is inherent in the moral
nature of people as autonomous agents. Id. at 62–63 & nn.1–2 (noting that this position is
sometimes taken). A number of commentators have discussed the nature of rights as
instrumental (versus intrinsic). See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 198
(1977) (explaining that enforcing rights must have some point or purpose as its object); JEFF
MCMAHAN, THE ETHICS OF KILLING: PROBLEMS AT THE MARGINS OF LIFE 330 (2002)
(“[R]ights presuppose interests . . . .”); JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JULES L. COLEMAN,
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: AN INTRODUCTION TO JURISPRUDENCE 74 (1990) (explaining that
“[r]ights are . . . justified for instrumental reasons” in a utilitarian framework).
54. See EDMUNDSON, supra note 53, at 42–43 (summarizing the Burkean argument that
“the specification of any plausible kind of right presupposes the existence of a background of
social convention”).
55. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71 art. 3, U.N.
GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948) (affirming the universal “right
to life, liberty and security of person”).
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example, rights to assembly, free exercise of religion, working in a
56
discrimination-free environment). Either way, a right is always
57
tethered to some purpose that it serves. This is particularly apparent
when rights shield citizens from governmental interference or
obligate the government to enforce other rights. As Professor Ronald
Dworkin has explained, instituting rights “is a complex and
troublesome practice that makes the Government’s job of securing
the general benefit more difficult and more expensive, and it would
58
be a frivolous and wrongful practice unless it served some point.”
Therefore, “[a]nyone who professes to take rights seriously, and who
praises our Government for respecting them, must have some sense
59
of what that point is.”
It follows that a right exists only insofar as legitimate interests
underlie it: its license is its limitation. Failing to acknowledge this
limit can quickly cause a right to appear capable of trampling other
values and rights in ways generally thought undesirable. An unlimited
60
right to free speech would permit libel; an unlimited right to the free
exercise of religion could disrupt schools and other government
61
functions. This problem is why an absolutist conception of rights is
62
widely considered untenable. Treating rights as absolutes “is an

56. See, e.g., id. at 71 art. 19 (“Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and
expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek,
receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.”).
57. For example, a person’s right to property exists, among other reasons, for the right
holder’s “enjoyment and disposal . . . of all his acquisitions.” 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *73.
58. DWORKIN, supra note 53, at 198, 198–200.
59. Id.
60. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U. S. 323, 341 (1974) (“The legitimate state
interest underlying the law of libel is the compensation of individuals for the harm inflicted on
them by defamatory falsehood. We would not lightly require the State to abandon this
purpose . . . .”).
61. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 867–70 (1982) (plurality opinion) (holding
that a school board could not remove books from the school library “in a narrowly partisan or
political manner” because doing so infringes students’ “right to receive ideas”); Mozert v. Bd. of
Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 1070 (6th Cir. 1987) (“[T]he requirement that public school students study
a basal reader series chosen by the school authorities does not create an unconstitutional burden
under the Free Exercise Clause when the students are not required to affirm or deny a belief or
engage or refrain from engaging in a practice prohibited or required by their religion.”).
62. See, e.g., Am. Bank & Trust Co. v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Atlanta, 256 U.S. 350, 358
(1921) (“[T]he word ‘right’ is one of the most deceptive of pitfalls; it is so easy to slip from a
qualified meaning in the premise to an unqualified one in the conclusion.”); EDMUNDSON,
supra note 53, at 147 (“At some point, what has been called the ‘no threshold’ view [of rights]
begins to seem implausible.”); MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT
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illusion” that “tend[s] to downgrade rights into the mere expression
63
of unbounded desires and wants.” The First Amendment does not
protect people who shout “fire!” in a crowded theater because that
action strays beyond what the justification for free speech rights
64
allows. Therefore, a court’s first job when determining whether a
right has been violated is to decide whether the asserted right protects
the action at issue. As part of this inquiry, one ground “that can
consistently be used to limit the definition of a particular right. . . . [is
to] show that the values protected by the original right are not really
at stake in the marginal case or are at stake only in some attenuated
65
form.” When a right’s underlying values are not involved, that right
does not exist.
Second, rights act as “trumps.” The point of declaring something
a right is to establish that it “trumps . . . other competing moral
considerations,” even when the government is tempted to hamper the
66
right for the sake of some social value. But just because a right
67
indicates an underlying “trump suit” of moral or legal interests does

POLITICAL DISCOURSE 44–46 (1991) (presenting several reasons interpreting rights as
absolutes is unworkable).
63. GLENDON, supra note 62, at 45.
64. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (“The most stringent protection of
free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic.”).
65. DWORKIN, supra note 53, at 198–204 (arguing that rights cannot be violated merely
“for supposed reasons of the general good”). Professor Dworkin continues by reasoning that the
government should only abridge a right “in clear-cut cases . . . when some compelling reason is
presented, some reason that is consistent with the suppositions on which the original right must
be based. It cannot be an argument for curtailing a right, once granted, simply that society
would pay a further price for extending it.” Id. at 200. Facing a challenge to a state’s election
laws, Justice Stevens summarized quite nicely how a court would weigh rights and underlying
interests:
[A] court must resolve such a challenge by an analytical process that parallels its work
in ordinary litigation. It must first consider the character and magnitude of the
asserted injury to the rights protected by the [Constitution] that the plaintiff seeks to
vindicate. It then must identify and evaluate the precise interests put forward by the
State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule. In passing judgment, the
Court must not only determine the legitimacy and strength of each of those interests,
it also must consider the extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden
the plaintiff’s rights. Only after weighing all these factors is the reviewing court in a
position to decide whether the challenged provision is unconstitutional.
OF

Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983).
66. EDMUNDSON, supra note 53, at 145. This explanation of the function of rights reflects a
rather strong view of rights. Although rights are sometimes considered weaker and more easily
violable than this Part describes, the view of rights this Note takes only makes the Note’s
argument more difficult because it establishes a high bar for infringing traditionally protected
free speech.
67. Id.
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not mean it cannot be overridden by another trump. “[T]aking any
[constitutional right] as far as it can go soon brings it into conflict with
69
others,” at which point one right must override the other. To trump
a right—that is, to infringe on it—one may prove another right
conflicts with it. The conflict of one right with another right prompts a
court, a legislature, or some other decisionmaker to consider the
various factors and interests and arrive at a decision to limit one right
70
or the other.
Two ways therefore exist to limit a right—either by showing that
a right cannot logically exist beyond when underlying, legitimate
interests justify its existence or by showing why it must yield to
71
another right. These two mechanisms are central to explaining the
flaw in the WRTL Court’s analysis. The next two Parts apply these
mechanisms to demonstrate how the notion of democracy provides
two independent reasons for limiting the First Amendment right to
free speech. First, Part III develops the idea that, because the
maintenance of democracy and good governance is the primary
reason for First Amendment political speech protections, it also
marks the outer boundary of political speech rights. Second, Part IV
shows that in campaign finance reform cases, the independent right to
democratic governance conflicts with political speech rights. For both
reasons, the logic of the WRTL Court is problematic because it
arbitrarily vitiated essential considerations from its calculus, setting a
dangerous precedent.
III. DEMOCRACY AS THE RATIONALE FOR FREE SPEECH
As Part II has explained, a right can exist only when its
underlying interests are at stake. Campaign finance cases such as
McConnell and WRTL provide opportunities for the Supreme Court
to trace the contours of the right to free speech, identifying the right’s
legal and historical rationales to evaluate more precisely the bounds
of that right. As Section A explains, a robust set of philosophical and
practical goals underpin the right to free speech. Section B shows how

68. Id. at 146.
69. GLENDON, supra note 62, at 44; see also supra notes 60–65 and accompanying text.
70. DWORKIN, supra note 53, at 198–200.
71. Cf. DVD: American Foreign Policy in the War on Terror: Is Torture Ever Acceptable?
(Columbia Law School 2005) (on file with author) (explaining that one can qualify or limit a
right either “by . . . [allowing] it to be subordinated to” other rights or values or by “redefin[ing]
the central idea” to exclude certain circumstances).
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the WRTL Court ignored these purposes, undermining its analysis
and its holding.
A. Why the First Amendment Right to Free Speech Exists
Commentators often lament the Supreme Court’s muddled
72
jurisprudence regarding the use of money in politics. Although the
First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no
73
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech,” its simple language gives
little indication as to what that freedom of speech entails. “Even the
rhetorically principled Justice Scalia, with his almost religious
adherence to textualism . . . has acknowledged that ‘[the First
Amendment] does not list the full range of [protected]
74
communicative expression.’” There is, as a result, plenty of room for
disagreement over the meaning of the First Amendment, including
whether it was intended to protect financial expenditures made to
75
communicate a political message.
The task of determining the meaning of the pithy amendment
ultimately falls upon the United States Supreme Court. “Because
campaign finance reform legislation, in its attempt to effectively
combat circumvention, invariably touches upon so many types of
conduct the Court has been forced to apply First Amendment
76
principles to a complex array of regulatory provisions.” Typically
mired in fact-specific determinations and opinions by justices who can
scarcely agree, the Court’s jurisprudence consequently tends not to
provide broad or straightforward answers to constitutional questions

72. See, e.g., Wayne Batchis, Reconciling Campaign Finance Reform with the First
Amendment: Looking Both Inside and Outside America’s Borders, 25 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 27,
48–49 (2006) (“The confusing morass of perspectives on the constitutionality of campaign
finance reform revealed by the Court’s decisions to date, and solidified by its most recent
opinions in McConnell and Randall, has cast the future of reform into a cloud of uncertainty.”);
see also, e.g., Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 591 (1982)
(“There seems to be general agreement that the Supreme Court has failed in its attempts to
devise a coherent theory of free expression.”).
73. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
74. Batchis, supra note 72, at 42 (alterations in original) (quoting Antonin Scalia,
Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in
Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE LAW 3, 37–38 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997)).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 43. “[T]he Supreme Court’s jurisprudence with regard to [campaign finance
reform] issues makes matters worse.” Id.
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77

on the subject. As the disagreement between the McConnell and
WRTL opinions demonstrates, the Justices disagree not only on the
conclusion (whether to allow restrictions on certain forms of speech)
but also on how to arrive at a conclusion.
Since the Founding, “several different views as to why freedom
78
of speech should be regarded as a fundamental right” have emerged.
None of these rationales is exclusive, and writers often assume that
79
they all coexist. Among the rationales for free speech are the
80
81
advancement of individual autonomy, the discovery of truth, and
82
the promotion of tolerance. But one of the strongest explanations is
that the right to free speech derives from the nature of democracy
83
itself. There is a great deal of evidence that the Founders were
concerned about “whether societies of men are really capable or not
of establishing good government from reflection and choice, or
whether they are forever destined to depend for their political
84
constitutions on accident and force.” On one hand, the Founders
valued free speech because it “[l]et[s] [Truth] and Falsehood

77. Id.; see also Redish, supra note 72, at 591 (“There seems to be general agreement that
the Supreme Court has failed in its attempts to devise a coherent theory of free expression.
These efforts have been characterized by ‘a pattern of aborted doctrines, shifting rationales, and
frequent changes of position by individual Justices.’” (footnote omitted) (quoting Vincent Blasi,
The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 521, 526)).
78. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 2, § 11.1.2, at 925–30 (outlining the four major speech
rationales this Section summarizes); see also Emerson, supra note 4, at 878–79 (identifying four
categories of “values sought by society in protecting the right to freedom of expression”).
79. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 2, § 11.1.2, at 925.
80. See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA
L. REV. 964, 966 (1978) (arguing for a “liberty theory [that] justifies protection because of the
way the protected conduct fosters individual self-realization and self-determination”); Redish,
supra note 72, at 593 (“[T]he constitutional guarantee of free speech ultimately serves only one
true value, which I have labeled ‘individual self-realization.’”).
81. See, e.g., Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
(“[T]he best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of
the market . . . .”); Emerson, supra note 4, at 878 (“The values sought by society in protecting
the right to freedom of expression . . . [include] a means of attaining the truth . . . .”).
82. See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 2, § 11.1.2, at 930 (outlining the reasons freedom of
speech should be a fundamental right (citing LEE BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY:
FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXTREMIST SPEECH IN AMERICA 9–10 (1986))).
83. See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47
IND. L.J. 1, 20 (1971) (“Constitutional protection should be accorded only to speech that is
explicitly political. There is no basis for judicial intervention to protect any other form of
expression . . . .”); see also, e.g., MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 6, at 27 (noting that the right to free
speech is “a deduction from the basic American agreement that public issues shall be decided by
universal suffrage”).
84. THE FEDERALIST NO. 1 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 5, at 33.

CALABRIA IN FINAL FOR WESTLAW AND LEXIS.DOC

2009]

REMEMBERING DEMOCRACY

2/10/2009 12:02:30 PM

843

grapple”; it provides the ground rules through which robust debate
85
and dialogue can most easily promote human happiness. On the
other hand, the right to free speech prevents “suppression by the
government of political ideas of which it disapprove[s], or which it
86
f[inds] threatening.” For these reasons, “[w]hatever differences may
exist about interpretations of the First Amendment, there is
practically universal agreement that a major purpose of that
Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental
87
affairs.”
Supreme Court jurisprudence has long reflected this view, often
taking the position that “the ability to criticize government and
government officers [is] ‘the central meaning of the First
88
Amendment.’” As Justice Louis Brandeis put it, “[t]hose who won
our independence believed that . . . . [the] freedom . . . to speak as you
think” is “indispensable to the discovery and spread of political
truth,” protects “against the dissemination of noxious doctrine,”
guarantees the substance of the freedom of assembly, and promotes
89
“stable government.” The freedom of expression is therefore a
90
“fundamental principle of the American government.” The
democracy rationale seems especially appropriate for political speech,
for which the First Amendment has its “fullest and most urgent

85. JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA; A SPEECH OF MR. JOHN MILTON FOR THE LIBERTY
UNLICENC’D PRINTING TO THE PARLIAMENT OF ENGLAND 35 (London, Percy Lund,
Humphries & Co. Ltd. 1927) (1644); see also Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an
Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245, 255, 255–57 (“Self-government can exist only insofar as the
voters acquire the intelligence, integrity, sensitivity, and generous devotion to the general
welfare that, in theory, casting a ballot is assumed to express.”).
86. SUNSTEIN, supra note 3, at 132. “There can be little doubt that suppression by the
government of political ideas of which it disapproved, or which it found threatening, was the
central motivation for the [First Amendment free speech] clause.” Id.
87. Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966); see also SUNSTEIN, supra note 3, at 132
(“The best view of the relevant history is that political speech was thought to form the core of
the free speech principle.”).
88. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 2, § 11.1.2, at 927 (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 273 (1964)). “There is little disagreement that political speech is at the core of that
protected by the First Amendment.” Id.; see also, e.g., Mills, 384 U.S. at 218 (explaining that the
“free discussion of governmental affairs” is one of the primary rationales for First Amendment
protections); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
(“[M]en . . . may come to believe . . . that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free
trade in ideas . . . and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried
out. That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution.”).
89. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375, 375–76 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
90. Id. at 375; see also Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74–75 (1964) (“[S]peech
concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government.”).
OF
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application” and for which the content of the speech is most clearly
91
aimed at affecting the political process.
Thus, maintaining a healthy democracy is one of the key interests
justifying First Amendment free speech protections. Its long tradition
in American history, legal theory, and jurisprudence establishes its
central role in questions of political expression.
B. The First Role Democracy Should Have Played in WRTL
The central issue before the Court in WRTL was whether the
92
BCRA’s regulations unjustifiably infringed on free speech rights.
93
Because rights exist only when interests justify them, it makes little
sense to evaluate the constitutionality of infringements on rights
without first determining the boundaries of the rights. Answering this
question would have required the Justices to establish whether free
speech rights existed to the extent that they conflicted with BCRA
restrictions. Determining the extent of free speech rights in turn
would have required them to examine the interests free speech rights
are supposed to protect: individual autonomy, the discovery of truth,
promotion of tolerance, and, most applicably, the maintenance of a
94
healthy democratic republic.
The WRTL majority, however, did not consider the effect that
BCRA had on democracy and other interests giving rise to free
95
speech rights. The Court therefore endeavored to protect a right
without inquiring whether the right exists. Because the Court refused
to determine whether political speech rights extended to protect
WRTL’s advertisements, it did not distinguish the right to political

91. Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971); see also Brown v. Hartlage, 456
U.S. 45, 53–54 (1982) (requiring a state to have a compelling interest before it restricts political
speech). To this end, the Supreme Court has held that political speech is entitled to protection
under the strict scrutiny standard. E.g., FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2664
(2007) (“Because BCRA § 203 burdens political speech, it is subject to strict scrutiny.”); Austin
v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 666 (1990); Brown, 456 U.S. at 53–54 (holding
that a statute nullifying a candidate’s electoral victory based on a false campaign promise that
the candidate promptly retracted was unconstitutional as applied because it was “inconsistent
with the atmosphere of robust political debate protected by the First Amendment”); First Nat’l
Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786 (1978) (“Especially where . . . speech is intimately
related to the process of governing . . . ‘the burden is on the government to show the existence
of [a compelling] interest.’” (quoting Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 362 (1976))).
92. Wis. Right to Life, 127 S. Ct. at 2664.
93. See supra Part II.
94. See supra notes 78–87 and accompanying text.
95. See supra notes 38–49 and accompanying text.
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speech from the mere act of political speech. The Supreme Court
therefore gave the dint of precedent to the idea that courts can
protect speech by presuming that the speaker had a right to it without
ever investigating to see whether in fact that right extended to the
speaker.
Tracing free speech back to its purposes adds another step to
courts’ free speech analysis, but requiring justification for First
Amendment rights does not necessarily make it more difficult to
protect them. Indeed, it is not a foregone conclusion that the WRTL
majority would have upheld the BCRA’s restrictions on speech had
the Court considered the extent of free speech protections based on
the purpose of the right. Instead of ignoring the underpinnings of free
speech, the Court could have said that free speech creates an open
marketplace of ideas, which best promotes democracy by allowing
96
citizens to discover the truth for themselves. It could have argued
that campaign finance regulations make it harder for challengers to
97
defeat incumbents; that political speech is most important during the
days before an election; or that the BCRA unduly encumbered other
interests underlying speech rights, such as self-realization and self98
expression. The Court raised none of these points. By abstaining, it
not only blinded itself to any harm it may have been doing
(acceptable or not), but it also signaled to future courts that
considering such values is not required.
IV. THE RIGHT TO DEMOCRACY
When one right conflicts with another, a court must balance the
99
rights to determine which one predominates. Although it only
recognized one, the WRTL Court was in fact deciding between two
100
rights: the right to free speech and the right to democracy. Without
identifying both rights and determining the extent to which they
conflicted (if at all), the Court overlooked the risk its decision posed
to the right of American citizens to democratic governance.

96. See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 112 (Yale University Press 2003) (London 1859)
(“[E]very opinion which embodies somewhat of the portion of truth which the common opinion
omits, ought to be considered precious . . . .”).
97. See POSNER, supra note 53, at 92 (describing the “perverse effects” of campaign finance
laws and the “arbitrary advantage” they confer to candidates with affluent supporters).
98. Baker, supra note 80, at 966.
99. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
100. See supra Part I.B.
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A. The Right to Democracy in American Law
The notion that United States citizens are entitled to republican
democracy is well worn in America’s history and its law. Two-and-ahalf years after the Boston Tea Party violently rejected taxation on
101
tea imports under the slogan, “No taxation without representation,”
the Declaration of Independence declared that, as Professor Thomas
M. Franck explains, “governments, instituted to secure the
‘unalienable rights’ of their citizens, derive ‘their just powers from the
102
consent of the governed.’” The Declaration of Independence
reinforced this position by providing “a second proposition”: “that a
nation earns ‘separate and equal station’ in the community of states
103
by demonstrating ‘a decent respect to the opinions of mankind.’”
The Constitution formally establishes elected legislative and
104
executive branches. It “guarantee[s] to every State . . . a Republican
105
Form of Government.”
Since the Founding, the sense that the United States government
106
is to be “of the people, by the people, for the people” has only
solidified. One indicator of the entitlement to participatory
government is the increasing inclusiveness of American democracy,
as the series of constitutional amendments extending the right to vote
107
demonstrates. Nearly half of the amendments passed after the Bill
108
of Rights have somehow expanded democratic participation.

101. See DANIEL A. SMITH, TAX CRUSADERS AND THE POLITICS OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY
21–23 (1998) (discussing the Boston Tea Party and other examples of popular resistance to taxes
in America).
102. Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. INT’L L.
46, 46 (1992); see also THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (“That to
secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the
consent of the governed . . . .”).
103. Franck, supra note 102, at 46; see also THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1
(articulating the philosophical basis for the Declaration of Independence).
104. U.S. CONST. arts. I–II; see also THE FEDERALIST No. 57 (James Madison), supra note
5, at 351 (“Who are to be the electors of the federal representatives? Not the rich, more than the
poor; not the learned, more than the ignorant; not the haughty heirs of distinguished names,
more than the humble sons of obscure and unpropitious fortune. The electors are to be the
great body of the people of the United States.”).
105. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
106. Abraham Lincoln, Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863), in GARRY WILLS, LINCOLN AT
GETTYSBURG: THE WORDS THAT REMADE AMERICA 263 (1992).
107. E.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964) (“[H]istory has seen a continuing
expansion of the scope of the right of suffrage in this country.”).
108. U.S. CONST. amend. XII (allowing voters to cast independent votes for president and
vice president); id. amend. XV (prohibiting proscriptions on the right to vote based on race,
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Another indicator is the importance this overarching notion of
democracy has been given in specific application, that is, how
democracy’s constituent practices have been protected by the
government. Perhaps the most direct proxy for the right to democracy
is the franchise. The Supreme Court has consistently held that the
right to vote is a fundamental right protected by the Equal Protection
109
Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. As Chief Justice
Earl Warren wrote, “The right to vote freely for the candidate of
one’s choice is of the essence of a democratic society, and any
restrictions on that right strike at the heart of representative
110
government.” Because the right to vote is “preservative of all
111
that demands
rights,” it is a “fundamental political right”
112
heightened protection under a strict scrutiny standard. The right to
democratic participation is so important that “[a]ny unjustified
discrimination in determining who may participate in political affairs
or in the selection of public officials undermines the legitimacy of
113
representative government.”

color, or previous servitude); id. amend. XVII (mandating the direct election of senators); id.
amend. XIX (establishing that neither states nor the federal government may deny the right to
vote based on the voter’s sex); id. amend. XXIII (granting presidential electors to the District of
Columbia); id. amend. XXIV (banning poll taxes in federal elections); id. amend. XXVI (setting
the minimum voting age at eighteen); see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 2, § 10.8.1, at 871–72
(discussing some of these amendments).
109. See, e.g., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000) (“[T]he right to vote as the legislature
has prescribed is fundamental; and one source of its fundamental nature lies in the equal weight
accorded to each vote and the equal dignity owed to each voter.”); Kramer v. Union Free Sch.
Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 626–27 (1969) (“Statutes granting the franchise to residents on a
selective basis always pose the danger of denying some citizens any effective voice in the
governmental affairs which substantially affect their lives. Therefore . . . the Court must
determine whether the exclusions are necessary to promote a compelling state interest.”
(footnote omitted)); Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966) (“We conclude
that a State violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment whenever it
makes the affluence of the voter or payment of any fee an electoral standard.”); Reynolds, 377
U.S. at 555 (“The right to vote can neither be denied outright . . . nor diluted . . . .” (citations
omitted)).
110. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 555.
111. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886); see also Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1,
17 (1964) (“No right is more precious in a free country than that of having a voice in the election
of those who make the laws under which, as good citizens, we must live. Other rights, even the
most basic, are illusory, if the right to vote is undermined.”).
112. E.g., Kramer, 395 U.S. at 627 (citing Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 96 (1965)); see
also Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 562 (“[S]ince the right to exercise the franchise in a free and
unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic civil and political rights, any alleged
infringement of the right of citizens to vote must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized.”).
113. Kramer, 395 U.S. at 626.
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The Supreme Court has zealously protected the right to vote
114
from many impediments. It has struck down poll taxes, residency
115
116
duration minimums, exclusions from the franchise based on race,
117
and property ownership requirements. Since 1962, the Supreme
Court has held that the population of electoral districts must be
roughly equal and that plaintiffs seeking their rights under this rule
118
may bring a justiciable claim.
The Court has subsequently
invalidated various attempts to malapportion or otherwise dilute the
119
voting power of particular citizens or districts. The Court has also
invalidated multimember voting districts in cases in which they
tended to “minimize the voting strength of [economic, ethnic,
120
political, or racial] minority groups.” In each case, the Court made
the right to vote fundamental—and extended equal protection—
121
because of the critical link between voting and democratic health.
The Court has also treated another individual right based on the
entitlement to democracy, the right of a candidate to appear on the
122
ballot, as a right worthy of protection. Courts have protected access

114. Harper, 383 U.S. at 666; see also id. at 686 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“Property and polltax qualifications, very simply, are not in accord with current egalitarian notions of how a
modern democracy should be organized.”).
115. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 360 (1972).
116. See, e.g., Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 341–48 (1960) (invalidating a districting
plan in Tuskegee, Alabama, that put almost all black residents outside the city limits); Nixon v.
Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 540–41 (1927) (declaring unconstitutional a Texas statute that barred
African Americans from voting in primaries).
117. City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204, 208–09 (1970) (municipal bonds);
Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 702 (1969) (per curiam) (utility bond referenda);
Kramer, 395 U.S. at 622 (property ownership requirements in school board elections).
118. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 237 (1962).
119. See, e.g., Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 744 (1983) (declaring unconstitutional a
districting scheme for the House of Representatives because of small variations in district size);
Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963) (“The conception of political equality from the
Declaration of Independence, to Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address, to the Fifteenth, Seventeenth,
and Nineteenth Amendments can mean only one thing—one person, one vote.”).
120. Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 616–17 (1982). But see City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446
U.S. 55, 70 (1980) (“[A] disproportionate impact alone cannot be decisive, and courts must look
to other evidence to support a finding of discriminatory purpose.”); White v. Regester, 412 U.S.
755, 765–66 (1973) (finding that two challenged multimember districts were unconstitutional
because they discriminated against blacks and Mexican Americans).
121. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561–62 (1964) (“Undoubtedly, the right of suffrage is a
fundamental matter in a free and democratic society.”); Sanders, 372 U.S. at 380–81.
122. See, e.g., Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 32, 30–32 (1968) (“Competition in ideas and
governmental policies is at the core of our electoral process and of the First Amendment
freedoms. New parties struggling for their place must have the time and opportunity to organize
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to the ballot against exorbitant filing fees and requirements that
124
candidates own real property. Defending a candidate’s right to
appear on the ballot, the Supreme Court provided yet another
democracy-oriented rationale by pointing out that infringing on that
right injures “the right of individuals to associate for the advancement
of political beliefs, and the right of qualified voters . . . to cast their
125
votes effectively,” two of “our most precious freedoms.”
A third example is the status of political speech as the crux of the
First Amendment right to speech. For the reasons Part III.A
discussed, free speech exists in large part to promote healthy political
discourse in a democracy. According to the Court, “speech
concerning public affairs” is “more than self-expression; it is the
126
essence of self-government.” The Supreme Court has therefore held
that political speech is entitled to protection under the strict scrutiny
127
standard largely because of its link to democracy.
These examples prompt a few observations. First, as the
founding documents and the constitutional amendments expanding
the electorate demonstrate, citizens are constitutionally entitled to
participatory governance. Second, the Court so highly values this
entitlement to democracy that it has found even lesser rights to be
fundamental to protect democratic governance. Third, the Court has
consistently struck down laws and practices that make the democratic
128
process substantially more ineffective, inequitable, or inauthentic.
in order to meet reasonable requirements for ballot position, just as the old parties have had in
the past.”).
123. See, e.g., Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 718 (1974) (invalidating filing fees imposed on
indigent candidates); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 149 (1972) (invalidating filing fees for
primary ballots).
124. E.g., Quinn v. Millsap, 491 U.S. 95, 106–07 (1989); Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 362
(1970).
125. Williams, 393 U.S. at 30 (emphasis added).
126. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74–75 (1964); see also Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S.
214, 218 (1966) (“[T]here is practically universal agreement that a major purpose of [the First]
Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs.”); Whitney v. California,
274 U.S. 357, 376, 375–76 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (“Recognizing the occasional
tyrannies of governing majorities, [the Founders] amended the Constitution so that free speech
and assembly should be guaranteed.”); supra Part III.A.
127. See supra note 91.
128. One might point out that antidemocratic elements are also central to the American
theory of government. Although true, the Court has tended to limit those elements to what
specific provisions explicitly mandate—but no further. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533,
568 (1964) (holding that, although the membership of the United States Senate is apportioned
by state and not by population, states may only apportion representatives and districts by
population).
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B. The Second Role Democracy Should Have Played in WRTL
American law establishes that democracy is an independent
right, an entitlement that people may expect the government to
protect. As a right itself, the democratic entitlement can conflict with
other rights. Whether the right to democracy conflicted with First
Amendment free speech protections in WRTL is an unresolved
question—one the Court majority did not even ask. In undertaking to
protect political speech without considering democracy, the Court
resembled homeowners who erect a fence around their property
without knowing where their property ends and their neighbor’s
begins.
One might wonder what harm occurs when a court fails to
consider any rights other than free expression in political speech cases
such as WRTL. The first answer is that, if a court fails properly to
recognize a right that nonetheless exists, it risks unknowingly
encroaching on the unrecognized right in ways that it might not be
able to justify otherwise. Some commentators, for example, have
argued that the Court’s decision in WRTL was a blow to the health of
129
American democracy. These impacts aside, the WRTL majority’s
decision has set the precedent that free speech may be considered in a
vacuum; if future cases follow it, their decisions too could injure the
democratic process.
Applying the right of representative governance in questions of
election reform would have other important implications.
Recognizing the right to democratic governance would put it on more
equal footing with the right to political speech. Political speech is
normally entitled to strict scrutiny protection, which is usually enough
130
to sound the death knell for whatever challenges it. But when free
speech conflicts with another right, the presumption against whatever
129. See, e.g., Press Release, Brennan Ctr. for Justice, Brennan Center Statement on Ruling
in FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life (June 25, 2007), http://www.brennancenter.org/
content/resource/brennan_center_statement_on_ruling_in_fec_v_wisconsin_right_to_life/ (“The
Supreme Court’s decision today re-opens the floodgates of unlimited special interest money in
federal elections . . . . The Court is willfully ignoring how modern campaigns work. The
exception created with this decision swallows the rule the Court found constitutional less than
four years ago.”). But see Newt Gingrich, Blacking out Speech: McCain-Feingold’s Assault on
Freedom, AM. ENTERPRISE INST. FOR PUB. POL’Y RES., June 1, 2006, http://www.aei.org/
publications/filter.all,pubID.24468/pub_detail.asp (arguing that the BCRA injured the “bond of
trust between the American people and their elected representatives” and made “it harder for
candidates of middle-class means to run for office at all”).
130. See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 211 (1992) (“[I]t is the rare case in which we have
held that a law survives strict scrutiny.”); supra note 91 and accompanying text.
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conflicts with it is not so one-sided. For example, Burson v. Freeman
held that a Tennessee statute barring political signage and vote
solicitation within one hundred feet of a polling location did “not
132
constitute an unconstitutional compromise.” The Court concluded
that when “the exercise of free speech rights conflicts with another
fundamental right, the right to cast a ballot in an election free from
the taint of intimidation and fraud,” the statute restraining free
133
speech may survive strict scrutiny.
Because the government
“indisputably has a compelling interest in preserving the integrity of
134
its election process,” recognizing democracy as a right would
135
prompt the Court to engineer a “compromise”; the Court would
weigh the two competing considerations against each other without
136
giving speech the benefit of the doubt. Recognizing democracy as a
fundamental right would therefore level the playing field, weakening
the presumption in favor of unbridled speech.
No Justice of the Supreme Court has explicitly used the right to
democracy as an enforceable right in the context of election reform.
The pro-regulation opinions of the McConnell majority and the
WRTL dissent have come close, however. In McConnell, the majority
used a less stringent standard of review than strict scrutiny because of
concerns regarding democracy:
Our treatment of contribution restrictions reflects more than the
limited burdens they impose on First Amendment freedoms. It also
reflects the importance of the interests that underlie contribution
limits—interests in preventing “both the actual corruption
threatened by large financial contributions and the eroding of public
confidence in the electoral process through the appearance of
corruption.” . . . Because the electoral process is the very “means
through which a free society democratically translates political
131. Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992).
132. Id. at 211.
133. Id. As the Court noted,
[Because activity], even in a quintessential public forum, may interfere with other
important activities for which the property is used. . . . the government may regulate
the time, place, and manner of the expressive activity, so long as such restrictions are
content neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest,
and leave open ample alternatives for communication.
Id. at 197.
134. Id. at 199 (quoting Eu v. S.F. County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 231
(1989)).
135. Id. at 211.
136. See, e.g., FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2669 (2007) (“Where the First
Amendment is implicated, the tie goes to the speaker, not the censor.”).
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speech into concrete governmental action,” contribution limits, like
other measures aimed at protecting the integrity of the process,
tangibly benefit public participation in political debate. For that
reason, when reviewing Congress’ decision to enact contribution
limits, “there is no place for a strong presumption against
constitutionality, of the sort often thought to accompany the words
137
‘strict scrutiny.’”

This reasoning suggests recognition that democracy is anomalous
among interests. The Court could just as easily have said that the
integrity of the democratic process is a compelling interest that meets
the strict scrutiny standard. Its refusal to afford strict scrutiny
protection in this case—and to require the government to meet the
compelling government interest standard that accompanies strict
scrutiny protections—marks democracy as fundamentally different
from the typical interests that might arise in such a case. The Court
treats democracy as a right to be balanced against another right,
rather than an interest that must meet its heavy burden.
In the WRTL dissent, Justice Souter cites the “compelling
interest” standard only once and only when recounting McConnell’s
understanding of the importance of limiting electioneering
138
communications. Yet he made extended appeals to an idea he called
139
“democratic integrity,” a concept whose roots may stretch back at
least to the Court’s 1989 opinion in Eu v. San Francisco County
140
Democratic Central Committee, which discussed the importance of
141
“preserving the integrity of [the] election process.” Justice Souter
claimed that keeping undue power out of the hands of “deep
142
pockets,” making political expenditures better represent “political

137. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 136–37 (2003) (citations omitted) (quoting Nixon v.
Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 401, 400 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring); FEC v. Nat’l
Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 208 (1982)). McConnell was referring to Buckley’s use of
“closely drawn” scrutiny for campaign contributions. The McConnell majority recognized that
setting a less stringent standard of review has been a lightning rod for attacks from the more
conservative Justices. See id. at 137 (“Our application of this less rigorous degree of scrutiny has
given rise to significant criticism in the past from our dissenting colleagues.”).
138. Wis. Right to Life, 127 S. Ct. at 2696 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“[In McConnell, we]
understood that Congress had a compelling interest in limiting this sort of electioneering by
corporations and unions . . . .”).
139. Id. at 2687.
140. Eu v. S.F. County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214 (1989).
141. Id. at 231; see also Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 199 (1992) (discussing the
protection of “the integrity and reliability” of the electoral process).
142. Wis. Right to Life, 127 S. Ct. at 2688 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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preference” rather than the interests of “high-dollar pragmatists” that
143
144
buy influence, and mitigating “pervasive public cynicism” are all
“elements summed up in the notion of political integrity, giving it a
145
value second to none in a free society.” He then spent several pages
delineating the historical evolution and ideological roots of the
democratic integrity concept, claiming also that it has been “obvious”
since roughly the end of the Civil War “that the purchase of influence
and the cynicism of voters threaten the integrity and stability of
democratic government, each derived from the responsiveness of its
146
law to the interests of citizens and their confidence in that focus.”
Thus, the WRTL dissent emphasized protecting political
integrity and not the question of showing a compelling interest
narrowly tailored to achieving that object. This departure from the
traditional threshold question, although not an embrace of the rightsoriented analysis this Note suggests, moves in that direction.
Using the right to democratic governance to counterbalance the
freedom of speech would hopefully counteract the tendency of
regulation opponents to dismiss the harms to democratic governance
that a failure to regulate could cause. Courts should not consider
impacts on democracy only when doing so is convenient or supports
their arguments. Acknowledging democracy as a right would hold
judges accountable to addressing it. If democracy is more than a
backdrop for individual rights, courts cannot ignore or circumvent its
implications for lack of precedent. Consequently, recognizing the
right to democracy would clarify the debate over campaign reform
because both pro- and anti-regulation advocates would be able to
identify the core issue—whether free speech conflicts with democracy
and, if so, whether it trumps democratic considerations.
Additionally, the Supreme Court’s failure to recognize
democracy as a right has uncomfortable implications for the United
States’ international relations. When the United States government
advocates for something abroad that it is unwilling to implement
147
domestically, it may be seen as hypocritical by foreign nations.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 2689 (emphasis added). Justice Souter also remarked that Congress has
recognized democratic integrity and acted against threats to it. Id. at 2687.
146. Id. at 2689.
147. For example, before the Supreme Court decided Brown v. Board of Education, 347
U.S. 483 (1954), and before the civil rights movement had run its course, observers often
remarked that segregation and racial discrimination in the United States were “a source of
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While the Supreme Court was handing down its WRTL decision, the
federal government was working to maintain a fledgling electoral
system in Iraq that imposed by law a “media silence period” directly
148
during elections. This regulation went far beyond the proscriptions
of the BCRA; it barred the media from reporting on partisan
149
activities for a certain length of time before Iraqi elections. Thus,
the law would have been unconstitutional by WRTL standards. The
United States’ efforts to set up such electoral systems abroad,
combined with its emphatic participation in treaties that entitle
150
individuals to democratic governance, causes the Court’s language
in WRTL to ring hollow. Recognizing the right to democracy at home
would not hurt United States foreign policy efforts to spread
151
democracy abroad.

constant embarrassment to [the United States] Government in the day-to-day conduct of its
foreign relations; and it jeopardize[d] the effective maintenance of [its] moral leadership of the
free and democratic nations of the world.” Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme
Court, Address at the Centre for Human Rights of the University of Pretoria (Feb. 7, 2006),
available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/speeches/sp_02-07a-06.html (quoting
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 8, Brown, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Nos. 8, 101, 191,
413, 448), 1952 WL 82045). As Chief Justice Earl Warren explained eighteen years after Brown,
the change in United States race relations policies
was fostered primarily by the presence of [World War II] itself. . . . While proclaiming
themselves inexorably opposed to Hitler’s practices, many Americans were tolerating
the segregation and humiliation of nonwhites within their own borders. The
contradiction between the egalitarian rhetoric employed against the Nazis and the
presence of racial segregation in America was a painful one.
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting retired Chief Justice Earl Warren). Thus, “there is little
doubt” that the Brown decision “both reflected and propelled the development of human rights
protection internationally.” Id.
148. See Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq Regulation 11/2004, § 2.3 (2004),
available at http://uniraq.org/elections/regulations.asp (“There shall be a media silence period
between the end of the campaign period and the closing of the polling stations at the end of
polling, during which there shall be no media coverage of any Iraqi partisan political activity.”).
149. Id.
150. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 55/96, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/55/96 (Feb. 28, 2001)
(calling on states to promote democracy by establishing certain rights); G.A. Res. 46/137, U.N.
GAOR 46th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/46/137 (Dec. 17, 1991) (calling on states to enhance the
effectiveness of periodic and genuine elections by affirming and respecting their citizens’ right
to political participation); Charter of the Organization of American States art. III, Apr. 30, 1948,
2 U.S.T. 2394, 119 U.N.T.S. 3 (creating a duty for states to work toward “the effective exercise
of representative democracy”).
151. The United States has sometimes used whether another government is democratically
governed as a criterion for recognizing a state. See, e.g., LORI FISLER DAMROSCH ET AL.,
INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 258 (4th ed. 2001) (discussing U.S. Secretary of
State James Baker’s policy, which included support for democracy as a criterion for recognition
of statehood).
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CONCLUSION
Democracy is more than background scenery. It is both an
underlying justification for free speech rights and an independent
entitlement of citizens distinct from other rights. Regulations and
private action can strengthen or threaten it. The Supreme Court’s
decision in WRTL overlooks this important value, not because it
found that the government’s regulations burdened political speech or
because it determined that free speech and democracy could coexist,
but because it held that the empirical implications of political speech
and government regulation had no bearing.
This decision was problematic for two reasons. First, democracy
is one of the primary reasons political speech rights exist. The right to
political speech therefore extends only insofar as this root purpose
demands. But when a court forgets the interests underlying a right
and seeks to enforce a right in absolute form—as the Court did in
WRTL—it risks extending the protections of that right to a point so
unjustified that the right’s exercise becomes antithetical to its
purpose. Second, democracy is an independent entitlement. The
Constitution, the American tradition, and American law all implicitly
recognize this democratic entitlement. To ignore this right as the
WRTL majority did is to deny its validity and its value, signaling that
democracy is of no consequence in free speech jurisprudence.
Hopefully future judges will genuinely consider how money in
politics strengthens or hinders democracy, because upholding other
rights and interests without considering their impacts on democracy
ignores a critical element in the American system of rights.
Democracy has played a central role in American history and legal
theory. For any judicial decision to remain true to democracy’s
importance, it is up to the judge to treat it as more than a mere paper
commitment.

